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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

FRANK MADRID,

:

Case No. 981404-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
ARGUMENT
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.

FOR NOT CHALLENGING

THE

The State asserts in its brief ("S.B.") that Frank Madrid's
("Madrid") trial counsel was not ineffective although he failed to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.

See State v. Hovater,

914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (setting forth
analysis

for

Appellant's

ineffective

Brief

assistance

("A.B.") at Point
assistance

I

of

counsel);see

(providing

Madrid's

ineffective

argument).

argument

on appeal, the State, in part, contends

also

analysis of

In support

of its

that

Madrid

"relies upon incorrect law . . . [in citing] State v. Hill, 727
P.2d

221

(Utah

1986),

for the proposition

that

when

only

circumstantial evidence is presented, the 'evidence supporting a
conviction

must

preclude

every

reasonable

hypothesis

of

innocence.'" S.B. at 12 (citing A.B.13; (quoting Hill, 727 P.2d at
222) .2
1

With regard to Madrid's claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, Madrid submits on his opening brief in response to
points made in the State's brief which are not specifically
addressed in this reply brief. See A.B. Point I.

Contrary to the State's assertion, however, the Hill analysis
cited by Madrid, see A.B. 12-13, is not "incorrect law".
Rather,

Hill

provides

the

correct

analytical

S.B. 12.

framework

for

assessing the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented
at trial below.

In making its argument, the State cites to State

v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah App. 1998) and State v. Blubaugh,
904 P.2d 688, 695

(Utah App. 1995), cert, denied 913 P.2d

7491

(Utah 1996), which provide that "'[t]he existence of one or more
alternate reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the
jury from concluding that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1 "

Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281 (quoting Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at

695) .
A close reading of Blubaugh, the legal basis of Lyman, reveals
that Hill is consistent with their holdings.

Although Blubaugh

states that circumstantial evidence need not preclude every
conceivable

theory

of

innocence,

evidence preclude reasonable
694-95.

it

still

requires

hypotheses of innocence.

Citing the Supreme Court's opinion in

and

that

any
such

904 P.2d at

State v. Tanner,

675 P. 2d 53 9 (Utah 1983) and an opinion from the Texas Court of
Appeals, Huerta v. State, 635 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982), the
Blubaugh Court explained that

"''[t]he rules of

circumstantial

evidence do not require that the circumstances should to a moral
certainty actually exclude every hypothesis that the act may have
been committed by another person, but the hypothesis intended is a
reasonable

one

consistent

with

2

the

circumstances

and

facts

proved.''" 904 P.2d at 695

(quoting Tanner, 675 P.2d at 550-51

(quoting Huerta, 635 S.W.2d at 851)).
In an earlier opinion, the Supreme Court in Tanner reinforced
the need to preclude reasonable
to any

and every

hypotheses of innocence, as opposed

conceivable hypotheses of innocence.

"To sustain a verdict based on circumstantial evidence,
it is not necessary that such evidence exclude every
possible doubt or theoretical supposition in no way
related to the facts or circumstances of the case. It
is

enough that such evidence
hypothesis
of
innocence."

exclude

every

reasonable

675 P. 2d at 551 (emphasis added) (quoting Aldridcre v. Mississippi,
398 So.2d 1308, 1311 (Miss. 1981)).
Hence, contrary to the State's assertion on appeal, the Hill
analysis has not been
Blubauah and Lyman.
circumstantial

superceded by this Court's opinions

in

Indeed, Hill, which likewise provides that

evidence must preclude reasonable

hypotheses of

innocence, 727 P.2d at 222, is consistent with the authority cited
by the State. Hill is, therefore, the correct analytical framework
for assessing the viability of a claim of insufficient evidence in
this

case

and,

in

turn,

whether

Madrid's

counsel

rendered

ineffective assistance in failing to make such a challenge before
the trial court.

See A.B. Point I.

To the extent that the circumstantial evidence in this case
failed to preclude the reasonable hypothesis of Madrid's innocence,
Hill, Blubauah, and Lyman instruct that Madrid's convictions for
burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995) , and attempted theft,
Utah

Code

Ann.

§§

76-6-404

and
3

76-6-101

(1995),

fail

for

insufficient
render

evidence.

effective

Hence, Madrid's trial counsel did not

assistance

sufficiency of the evidence.

where

he

failed

to

challenge

the

See A.B. Point I.

Specifically, as discussed in Madrid's opening brief, the
circumstantial evidence presented below (the State did not present
any direct evidence substantiating the allegations against Madrid),
did not sufficiently foreclose the defense theory that Madrid was
unaware of, nor in any measure an accomplice to, the burglary and
attempted theft of the Paddock/Reeves home.

See A.B. 12-18.

In addition, and contrary to the State's contention on appeal,
case law discussing the sufficiency of the evidence in similar
scenarios
sufficiency

demonstrates
of

the

the evidence

viability

of

a

challenge

in this case and, hence,

to

the

defense

counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to raise the challenge below.
The State challenges Madrid's reliance upon the facts of Hill, 727
P.2d 221, and State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60 (Utah 1987), two cases
wherein convictions were overturned for insufficient circumstantial
evidence.

S.B. 13-15.

The State argues in particular that Madrid

is "tied more closely to the crime" than the defendants in Hill and
Kalisz, noting

that Madrid was parked

in

"Paddock's

[parking]

spot"; that defendant was near the burgled home, acting "presumably
the lookout"; that defendant acted "in a suspicious manner" and
then "left hurriedly with his unidentified co-perpetrator."

S.B.

14-15.
In fact, the defendants in Hill and Kalisz bore as many, if
not more, ties to the respective crimes than Madrid has with the
4

burglary and attempted theft of the Paddock/Reeves home.

For

example, in Hill, the defendant was placed at the scene of the
crime, an antiques store, the day before the crime occurred and
evidence established that he actually showed interest in the stolen
items later found in his possession.

727 P. 2d at 222. A statement

of one other person, read into evidence by a testifying officer,
also indicated that the defendant and another party conspired to
take the items from the antiques store.

Id.

Madrid, unlike the defendant in Hill, was not placed at the
crime scene. He was in his own neighborhood, walking on the public
sidewalk

alongside

the

Paddock/Reeves

house.

R.110 [127,161] .

Moreover, there was no accomplice testimony linking Madrid to the
crime; the other man seen jumping the fence was never identified or
apprehended.

R.100.

Additionally,

Madrid was not parked

in

"Paddock's parking spot" as the State suggests, S.B.14, for the
evidence in no way suggests that there were assigned parking stalls
in the residential neighborhood.

Rather, the evidence shows that

Madrid was parked legally on a city street in a place where,
according

to Paddock, he habitually parked.

R.110 [125].

In

addition, Madrid had legitimate business in the neighborhood - - h e
was

looking

at

Paddock/Reeves
R.110 [127,161] .

a

home,

van

that

and

was

Madrid

down

the

himself

street

lived

in

from
the

the
area.

The defendant in Hill, by contrast, had a more

suspect connection to the crime scene insofar as he had no other
business with the antiques shop other than looking at certain items
that

were

for

sale

there

and

that
5

were

later

found

in

his

possession.

See 727 P.2d at 222.

The State likewise argues that Madrid's reliance on Kalisz is
misplaced because, according to the State, the facts of Madrid's
case more "strong[ly]" suggest guilt.
of

the

Kalisz

defendant's

case,

where

aggravated

the

robbery

S.B.15.

Supreme

However, the facts

Court

conviction

overturned

for

the

insufficient

circumstantial evidence, actually parallel those of Madrid's case.
Hence, Kalisz indicates that Madrid's defense counsel could have
made a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and
was ineffective for failing to do so.
Similar to the present case, the defendant

in Kalisz was

placed in a car with another party within hours of an aggravated
robbery for which the other party was later apprehended.

73 5 P. 2d

at 61. Moreover, like Kalisz, incriminating evidence was not found
on Madrid's person or in his possession.
circumstances

Id.

If anything, the

of Madrid's case are less compelling

than those

present in Kalisz because the defendant in Kalisz falsely reported
to investigating officers that he took the person who committed the
robbery to the hospital, a claim which could be construed by a jury
as an attempt to cover his own involvement in the crime and explain
away his suspicious affiliation with the perpetrator.
evidence

here

does not

suggest

that Madrid

Id.

ever made

The

such a

patently false and misleading claim to investigating officers in
this case.
In short, the State's assertion that Madrid has closer ties
with the burglary and attempted theft than the defendants in Hill
6

and

Kalisz

unfounded.

had with

the

respective

crimes

in those

cases

is

In reality, Hill and Kalisz reinforce the viability of

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence insofar as the
defendants in those cases had the same sort of connections with the
crimes of which they were later acquitted on appeal.

Indeed, in

many respects, the evidence against those defendants was arguably
more suspect than the evidence presented against Madrid.

Yet, the

Hill and Kalisz Courts held that the circumstantial evidence was
not strong enough to support the jury convictions in those cases.
See Hill, 727 P.2d at 223; Kalisz, 735 P.2d at 61.

Where the

evidence against Madrid was not as compelling as that in Hill and
Kalisz, the viability of a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence is established.

In turn, defense counsel's failure to

raise the issue below constitutes ineffective assistance. See A.B.
Point I.
The State further cites State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah
1984), State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188

(Utah 1987), and State v.

McCullar, 674 P.2d 117 (Utah 1983) to bolster its position that
trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence in Madrid's case.

S.B.15-16.

The

State particularly notes these cases for the proposition that a
defendant need not be directly placed at the scene of a crime in
order

to

sustain

a

conviction

sufficiency of the evidence.

against

a

challenge

to

the

Id.

However, the cases cited by the State are distinguishable from
the circumstances of the case at bar.
7

For instance,

Bingham is

distinguishable because the defendant in that case was seen on the
premises of the burgled home, albeit not

in the home

itself,

running down the driveway with a stolen camera in his hand.
P. 2d at 44.

6 84

Madrid, on the other hand, was not spotted on the

premises of the Paddock/Reeve's home, nor "running" away, Bingham,
684 P. 2d at 44, as if to escape detection as the defendant in
Bingham was doing.

R.110[127-28].

Moreover, the evidence does not

establish that Madrid had any incriminating evidence in hand, id.,
like

the

stolen camera

driveway.

684 P.2d at 44.

Paddock/Reeve's
sidewalk.

that Bingham

home

when

R.110[127].

held as he

ran down the

Indeed, Madrid was walking toward the
he

was

noticed

by

Paddock

on

the

Hence, unlike the defendant in Bingham,

Madrid was not acting in the sort of suspiciously elusive manner
that would "permit [] the inference," Bingham, 684 P. 2d at 46, that
he was involved in the burglary and attempted theft at issue here.
McCullar is similarly distinctive from the present case.

In

McCullar, the evidence against the defendant consisted primarily of
the

testimony

of

two

accomplices, which

established

that

the

defendant was one of two men who broke into the victims' home and
took several items from the victims' at gunpoint.

674 P. 2d at 118.

The

the

victims'

testimony

further

corroborated

accomplice

testimony insofar as they testified that two unidentifiable men
broke into their home, one of them with a gun, bound the victims
with duct tape and tipped a couch on top of them.

Id.

The victims

further testified that the men then took several valuables from the
home.

Id.
8

Unlike McCullar, the evidence against Madrid does not consist
of any such accomplice testimony implicating Madrid in the burglary
and attempted theft at issue here.

R.110.

In fact, the man seen

jumping the fence was never identified or apprehended and therefore
was not available to testify at Madrid's trial.

Id.

Additionally,

Paddock, the victim in this case, could not offer the same sort of
detailed testimony that the victims in McCullar offered, indicating
with the sort of certainty that there were two people involved in
the burglary and attempted theft of his home.

Rather, Paddock

could only state that he saw Madrid walking along the sidewalk
around the time he saw the other man jump the fence, that Madrid
seemed in a panic when confronted by Paddock, and that Madrid and
the

other

person

R.110 [127-28] .

drove
Hence,

off

in

the

Paddock's

same

car

testimony

moments
about

later.

Madrid's

connection to the crime not definitive about the involvement of two
people, let alone conclusive about Madrid's alleged participation,
and therefore distinguishable from the evidence in McCullar.
Finally, Ellis is similarly distinguishable from the case at
bar.

In Ellis, the defendant was caught in a car with another man

driving slowly, then accelerating, past the scene of a burglary.
748 P. 2d at 189. Madrid, by contrast, was not behaving in the same
suspect manner as the defendant in Ellis until he met Paddock.
R.110 [127-28] .

Specifically, Madrid was walking toward his car

when he happened to

meet Paddock on the sidewalk.

Id.

It was not

until Paddock asked him in an accusatory manner why he was in the
yard

that

his

demeanor

changed
9

to what

Paddock

described

as

"panicky.."

Id.

Simultaneously, the other man was jumping the

fence and running toward Madrid's car, a fact that must

have

alarmed Madrid even further and clued him into the fact that the
other

person

was

probably

involved

in

criminal

activity.

R.110 [126] . Hence, Madrid himself stepped up his pace to reach his
car.

R. 110 [128,130] ; see also A.B.22-24 (discussing case law that

states a suspects act of avoiding confrontation does not support
inference

in the

similar

context

of

a

"reasonable

suspicion"

analysis).
In

sum,

the

facts

of

Blubaugh,

McCullar,

and

Ellis

are

stronger indications of guilt than the facts present in the case at
bar.

Hence, the inference that the defendants in those cases were

guilty of the respective crimes alleged, despite the fact that none
of them were directly placed at the scene of the crime, was more
reasonable than the jury's guilty verdict in this case.
In

light

of

the

foregoing,

defense

counsel

rendered

ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence in Madrid's case.
viable,

as

demonstrated

by

Such a challenge was not only

other

case

law,

but

"there

is

a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different."

Hovater, 914 P.2d at 3 9 (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694) .
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS SUBMISSION OF THE FLIGHT
INSTRUCTION AMOUNTS TO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

The State contends on appeal that the trial court's submission
of the flight instruction is supported by the evidence and, in any
event, does not amount to prejudicial error requiring reversal in
10

this case.
support

S.B. Point II. Madrid submits on his opening brief in

of

his

argument

that

supported by the evidence.

the

flight

instruction

See A. B. 20-25.

is

not

In response to the

State's harmless error analysis, Madrid makes the following points:
The

State

primarily

asserts

that

the

instruction

was

"prejudice-proofed" insofar as it admonished the jury that it could
infer guilt from flight only if the evidence supported such an
inference.

S.B.20; see also Addendum A

(flight instruction no.

24) . In support of its argument, the State cites four out-of-state
cases which held that the giving of similar flight instructions did
not merit reversal because they, too, admonished the jury that
flight supported an inference of guilt only to the extent that the
evidence established flight.

S.B.20-21 (citing Leverett v. State,

333 S.E.2d 609, 610 (Ga. 1985); Commonwealth v. Brown,, 605 N.E.2d
837, 839 (Mass. 1993); State v. Abraham, 451 S.E.2d 131. 157 (N.C.
1994); State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727, 733 (R.I. 1984)).
Utah case law is silent on the mitigating effect such an
admonition

to

the

jury

has

on

erroneous flight instruction.

the

prejudice

effected

by

an

Instead, as discussed in Madrid's

opening brief, Utah law states only that an erroneous submission of
a flight instruction may be harmless where the evidence against the
defendant is otherwise strong.

See A.B.26; State v. Bales, 675

P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1983) (finding erroneous submission of flight
instruction to be harmless where evidence provided "ample basis for
conviction").
Assuming for the sake of argument only that an admonition to
11

the jury regarding the need for evidentiary support of flight does
mitigate harm in this jurisdiction, the cases noted by the State,
but for one, instruct that such an admonition renders the error
harmless only where the evidence is otherwise strong.

In and of

itself, such an admonition does not cure prejudice.
For example, in Leverett, the evidence strongly supported the
flight instruction.

333 S.E.2d at 610.

The defendant was seen

running down the street after shooting his victim.
moments

later, the defendant

encountered

shouted, " [c] ome on and lock me up.

Id.

A few

a police officer and

I . . . shot [two persons] . "

Id.
Likewise in Abraham, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that

the

evidence.

contested

flight

451 S.E.2d at 157.

instruction

was

supported

in

the

In that case, the defendants were

seen by police walking away from the murder scene shortly after the
shooting

occurred.

Id.

at

156.

As

police

approached

defendants, they took a detour across a parking lot.

Id.

the

Upon an

officer's inquiry, the two defendants dubiously denied hearing any
gunfire and continued to walk away.

Id.

Lastly, one of the

defendant's was apprehended three weeks later in an apartment,
hiding in a closet under a pile of clothes.

Id. at 156-57.

Similarly in Cooke, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held
that the evidence justified the flight instruction.
733.

479 A. 2d at

The Court noted that the defendant, charged with arson, left

the crime scene immediately after the fire started.

Id.

The Court

further noted that defendant could not be found by his family for
12

ninety minutes thereafter.

Id.2

Interestingly, the Cooke Court instructed that, in the future,
trial courts were to include the four specific factors in their
flight instructions to ensure that juries properly viewed and did
not misuse flight evidence, as well as to minimize the risk of
prejudice to defendants.

Id. at 733.

Those factors included the

following four inferences: 1) that something that the defendant did
led him to flee; 2) that the defendant fled out of a consciousness
of guilt; 3) that defendant's consciousness of guilt derived from
consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; 4) and that
the defendant's consciousness of guilt regarding the crime charged
reflects actual guilt for that crime.

Id. (citing U.S. v. Meyers,

550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1997)).
These

four inferences recommended by the Cooke Court

are

identical in substance to the four factors outlined in Madrid's
opening brief in his discussion of the lack of the evidentiary
support for the flight instruction erroneously submitted in this
case.

See A.B.22

(citing U.S. v. Levine, 5 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th

Cir. 1993), cert, denied 510 U.S. 1180, 114 S.Ct. 1224, 127 L.Ed.2d
569 (1994) (other citations omitted). However, these four factors
were not outlined for the jury in the trial court's instruction,
2

But see Brown, 605 N.E.2d at 839. The Brown Court held
that the submission of the contested flight instruction was error
because it was not supported in evidence. Id. The Court
nonetheless held that such error was not prejudicial because the
jury was instructed that defendant's act of leaving the crime
scene might nonetheless support an inference of guilt in general,
and that it was the jury's prerogative to weigh such evidence.
Id.
13

see Addendum A (flight instruction), which further undermines its
efficacy in ensuring that the jury properly assessed the evidence
as it related to flight in this case.

In turn, the lack of these

guidelines in the "flight instruction compounds the prejudicial
effect

it

had

upon

the

jury's

deliberations

and

its

guilty

verdict.3
In short, Leverett, Abraham, and Cooke actually instruct that
an admonition to the jury is a factor in mitigation of harm only
where

the

evidence

instruction.

otherwise

strongly

supports

the

flight

In cases such as Madrid's, where the evidence of his

flight, and indeed his guilt, is ambiguous, see Bales, 675 P.2d at
576 (instructing that erroneous admission of flight instruction is
prejudicial where evidence of guilt is ambiguous), the fact that
the instruction admonished the jury does not lessen its prejudicial
effect.

See A.B. Point

II

(explaining how evidence

fails to

justify flight instruction in particular, the ambiguity of the
evidence going to Madrid's guilt in general, and the prejudicial
effect of the flight instruction in light of these two factors).
Accordingly,

the

State's

contention

that

the

instruction

was

"prejudice-proofed" is unfounded and does not justify affirmance of
Madrid's burglary and attempted theft convictions.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing and the arguments presented

in

3 In any event, similar guidance from this Court regarding the
wisdom of including the four, abovementioned factors in a flight
instruction might avoid future disputes over their propriety and
prejudicial effect.
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Madrid's, opening brief, Madrid respectfully requests this Court to
reverse

the

burglary

insufficient evidence.

and

attempted

theft

convictions

for

Should the Court find sufficient evidence,

Madrid requests that his convictions be reversed and the case
remanded

for

a new

trial

on

the basis

that

the

trial

court

committed harmful error in giving a flight instruction that was not
justified by the evidence.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Madrid respectfully requests oral argument on this matter.
SUBMITTED this

3A*L

day of August, 1999.
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ADDENDUM A

INSTRUCTION NO.^V

Flight or attempted flight, if any has been shown, of a person immediately after a
crime has been committed, or after that person has been accused of a crime, is not enough
alone to support a guilty verdict. However, you may certainly consider flight along with all
of the other evidence during your deliberations.
Keep in mind that there may be legitimate reasons for a person to flee that are
completely consistent with innocence. A person may flee because he or she feels guilty, but
that feeling of guilt may stem from something other than the crime with which he or she has
been charged. The jury must decide whether a person's flight constitutes evidence that the
person committed the crime charged.

